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Abstract 
This study explains how the escalation of the Iraq War led to a parallel civil sectarian 
war between Sunni and Shia insurgents during the years 2003-2006. I used the method 
of process-tracing and the theory Greed and Grievances. 
With the theory and method I could conduct the process-tracing and explain how the 
two independent variables opportunity and objective grievances fueled and enabled the 
insurgency to grow and divide into sectarian lines. Throughout my process-trace I found 
two formative events, the disbandment of the Ba’ath party and the Iraqi army which 
started the Sunni insurgency and Al Qaeda Iraq’s killings of Shia Muslims which gave 
rise to Shia insurgents. I also found that the occupation, inability to reconstruct the Iraqi 
society and provide security by the Coalition helped to fuel the two insurgency lines as 
the conflict morphed into a parallel civilian sectarian war. 
 
Key words: Greed, grievances, opportunity, objective grievances, insurgents, Iraq War, 
civil sectarian war. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War, civil war has been the most common type of 
armed conflicts. The Iraq war started as a conventional war but the conflict 
escalated to an insurgency based conflict.
1
 In 2006 there were 20,000-50,000 
Sunni insurgents and 60,000 Shia insurgents in Iraq while 2700-3800 Iraqis died 
each month. On the 22
th
 of February 2006 insurgents tied to Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) 
bombed the Golden Dome Mosque in Samara which caused the conflict to morph 
into a parallel civil sectarian war between Shia and Sunni religious ethnicities 
within the Iraq War that ravaged the country for two years.
2
 
Hashim notes that few observers of the post-Iraq invasion expected an 
insurgency based conflict.
3
 Still the insurgency did develop, and a civil sectarian 
war broke out despite the fact that the most powerful military force was 
responsible for the situation and security. The sectarian violence is still very much 
notable in Iraq, through the actions of the terrorist group The Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS). How then, did the war escalate to such extent that a civil 
sectarian war erupted between the years 2003-2006? 
To understand this situation and to explain it in a scientific way with a clear 
overlooking view, I will use the theory of Greed and Grievances. This theory was 
developed by Collier and Hoeffler and has been subject to great ovations and is 
held high within the UK department for international development.
4
 The theory is 
developed to explain the start of a civil war with the two independent variables 
opportunity and objective grievances and the dependent variable civil war starts. 
The theory will be explained in chapter three. Together with this theory, the 
method of process-tracing will be used. 
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1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this essay is to conduct a case study with the method of process-
tracing to explain the Iraq war’s escalation during the years 2003-2006 which led 
to a civil sectarian war by applying the Greed and grievances theory. 
 
In order to do this I will answer the following questions: 
 
 How did the Iraq war’s escalation during the years 2003-2006 lead to a civil 
sectarian war and how could the Greed and grievances theory help to explain 
this? 
1.2 Motivation 
I believe that a study of conflict with a high level of insurgency which has led 
to a civilian sectarian war is both relevant to society and science. Kilcullen notes 
that the Iraq war created a spillover effect of the conflict to neighboring 
countries.
5
 Today, Iraq is torn by terroristic violence and conflict, most notably 
conducted by the group ISIS who has its historical roots in the insurgency groups 
who were active in Iraq during the early years of the Iraq War.
6
 If you understand 
how a conflict escalates and a civil sectarian war erupts between religious 
ethnicities inside a war, you could take actions to prevent it. I believe that this 
could prove helpful for both academics and people who work with conflict 
prevention. 
The reason that I chose Iraq and the years 2003-2006 is the fact that it was 
during these years that the escalation took place, thus making my choice easy. The 
reason that I chose 2006 as an end date for my study is that the bombing of the 
Golden dome Mosque is widely known to have marked the beginning of the civil 
sectarian war.
7
 Due to limits of this essay I don’t find it possible to study more 
years than 2003-2006 without reduced quality of the essay. 
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1.3 Limit 
In order not to confuse the reader and to stay within the allowed size frame of 
this essay, the need for a definition is crucial. The Iraq War, the insurgency and 
the civil sectarian war between Sunni and Shia Muslims could be discussed in the 
light of an ethical discussion. This would have been interesting but the limit of 
this essay hinders me to conduct such a discussion. The human rights abuses 
conducted in the name of the war in Iraq could also been giving much more 
attention but the size frame is too narrow to be able to conduct such a discussion. 
Although it would have been interesting, I will not conduct any comparative case 
studies such as a comparison between the Iraq- and the Afghan insurgency and the 
violence between different ethnicities in the Afghan War. 
In the Iraq war there was a high amount of identifiable insurgency groups, but I 
will not outline such groups.
8
 Furthermore, I will use the term insurgency 
consequently, but I will discuss the definitions of the terms terrorist and freedom 
fighter briefly. 
1.4 Material 
I have used both primary and secondary material. My primary material consists 
of the US army and Marine Corps COIN Field manual. I used this in order to get 
information about the term insurgency. I have used Collier’s and Hoeffler’s article 
Greed and Grievances in Civil War regarding my theory, as well as Keens article 
with the same name regarding critique against the theory. When I studied the 
empirical material I used various articles and literature. The most contributing 
sources to my empirical material have been Hashim and his work Insurgency and 
Counter-Insurgency in Iraq and various works by Kilcullen. Kilcullen is the 
author of several books and articles about counterinsurgency and insurgencies, 
topics that I need to take into account when studying the Iraq War since the 
insurgents were the main enemy to the Coalition and Iraq as a state. When 
studying material concerning this topic, the need for a criticism of the sources is 
crucial since the risk of tendency could prove to be present, especially since both 
Kilcullen and Hashim has conducted field work within the frame of the Coalition 
in Iraq. To avoid the risk of tendency I’ve double checked the facts and compared 
it with various other sources.
9
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2 Terminology 
2.1 Civil Sectarian War 
According to Fearon, professor at the University of Berkeley, “A civil war is a 
violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take 
power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies”.10 A second 
criterion is that there need to be at least 1000 combat related deaths per year of 
which at least 5 % are from government forces and an identifiable rebel group.
11
 
There is no full consensus to the label civil war inside the Iraq War. The Bush 
administration defied this label in 2006, but according to Fearon the violence 
between Shia and Sunni Muslims fits the label for civil war because of the high 
level of sectarian violence between armed groups with ties to the Iraqi 
government and the power struggle between such groups. According to Fearon the 
reason of the Bush administration’s defiance to the label is the semantic failure it 
would mean to the US engagement in Iraq. Hughes, Kaldor, Kilcullen, Keen and 
Neumann note that a civil sectarian war was a reality in 2006. Since the civil war 
in Iraq contained sectarian violence it’s commonly labeled “sectarian”. 
Furthermore, Keen notes that the civil war was a parallel with the “real” war.12 
2.2 Insurgency 
Insurgency is an umbrella term, meaning an organizational movement that 
wages a political struggle with the intent to overthrow a regime, occupying force 
or government with armed conflict and subversion. Insurgents throughout history 
have been called revolutionaries, terrorists, rebels, militias and freedom fighters. 
Irrespective of the term used, the same type of strategy is used, namely irregular 
warfare or in a more recognizable term – guerrilla warfare.13 Insurgencies rely on 
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local populations, often with socio-economic problems, repression from the 
regime in question and other grievances that can be used as sympathy and support 
for the insurgency’s cause.14 Many insurgencies grow and recruit from pre-
existing social networks, e.g. family, tribes, villages, political parties or religious 
attribute.
15
 
Insurgencies are often concealed within an area with a high population or, as 
many of the modern insurgencies of today, in urban areas with no center of 
gravity and with an unclear hierarchy thus making it hard to counter them with 
regular methods.
16
 The term insurgency is not to be confused with the term 
terrorism, although modern insurgency tends to follow similar development as the 
current “new terrorism” does. Neumann notes that the structure of today’s 
terrorism lacks a center of gravity with an unclear hierarchy which is a common 
theme with modern insurgencies.
17
 Not all insurgents are terrorists, but some use 
terrorism as a mean to achieve their goals.
18
 The biggest difference between 
insurgency and terrorism is that insurgencies often have a clear political goal and 
intentions to control land or resources while “new” terrorists don’t strive to do 
this.
19
 
The term insurgent could be viewed as a negative political definition of 
freedom fighters. However, I believe that the term insurgency is the least non-
politicized term simply because it’s an umbrella term and could mean rebel, 
revolutionist, terrorist or freedom fighter.
20
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3 Theoretical Approach 
3.1 Greed and grievances 
The theory of Greed and grievance in civil war was developed by Collier and 
Hoeffler in 2004. As civil war has been the most viable type of conflict since the 
ending of the Cold war, Collier and Hoeffler developed an econometric model 
which tends to explain the outbreaks of rebellion and civil war.
21
 Their study was 
conducted on data from 79 large civil conflicts dating from 1960 to 1999 with a 
quantitative method which according to me gives their study and measurable 
variables a high external validity. Since I only study one case I will not do a 
quantitative study but a qualitative study using Collier’s and Hoeffler’s 
independent variables greed and grievances and their dependent variable civil war 
start.
22
 
Collier and Hoeffler takes the classic understanding of causes to rebellion and 
civil war (the notion that motive alone would be a sufficient cause when 
grievances are high and leads to civil war) to a deeper understanding with the 
notion that economic opportunity together with motive generated from grievances 
provides causes to civil war. They try both variables for themselves with 
quantitative data and then use both the variables and conclude that they have a 
stronger explanation value unified.
23
 
Collier and Hoeffler motivate their choice to bring in economic factors in their 
study and development of their model with reference to Grossmans work. 
Grossman notes that rebellions generate profit and make insurgents 
indistinguishable from bandits or pirates, hence rebellions create profitable 
opportunities.
24
  The authors name the greed variable opportunity and develop two 
distinct factors, each with several indicators.
25
 These will be outlined below. 
Collier and Hoeffler also take Hirshleifer’s work regarding perceptions in civil 
war outbreaks in consideration. Hirshleifer notes that causes of civil war could be 
wrongly perceived. However, if the causes were misperceived, the opportunity 
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and grievances that follows the civil war outbreak ought to be real and could 
generate genuine grievances and economic opportunities.
26
  
As all societies have some degree of grievances and since this is a term that 
could be viewed as subjective, Collier and Hoeffler uses four objective factors for 
the variable grievances which they name objective grievances. They only use 
factors that are known to cause conflict and civil war.
27
 They use various data and 
scales in order to measure grievances. However, the opportunity factors have a 
more explanatory value, but as they conduct a quantitative search, that is not 
strange. It’s hard to measure grievances since it’s feelings and is difficult to 
measure in numbers.
28
 A qualitative deductive search with might therefore suit the 
variable objective grievances better as I will delve deeper into relevant empirical 
facts than if I had used a quantitative approach. I will therefore take both variables 
into account. This will hopefully give me a more explanatory power regarding the 
objective grievances variable.
29
 
Collier’s book The Bottom Billion is based on the theory of greed and 
grievances, among others, and it states that that the theory can’t predict a civil war 
outbreak. In other words, there are no magic numbers regarding the different 
factors which tells when a civil war erupts. The variables and their inherent 
factors are prominent to be underlying structures that causes civil war but exactly 
when that happen, depends on the specific country and events in that country.
30
 
3.1.1 Opportunity  
The first factor within the variable Opportunity is the opportunity for financing 
rebellion. Without finance it ought to be hard to conduct a long lasting rebellion 
and rebellion that do last over a longer period of time with funds that cover the 
rebellions expense’s, tend to erupt in civil wars. Indicators for this factor are: 
extortion of natural resources, donations from diasporas and subventions from 
hostile governments.
31
 
 
Extortion of natural resources 
 
Extortion of natural resources could be a substantial income for rebel groups or 
for a government who disperse their income to chosen parts of the society, leaving 
others aside which could be a factor for civil war eruption. Collier and Hoeffler 
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didn’t find any particular decrease or increase in the natural recourses Gross 
domestic product (GPD) index in their study. They did however find a big 
difference in the dispersion of the natural resources which points to corruption, 
poor public service provision or economic mismanagement. If a government 
conducts poor governance or a rebel group seizes natural resource production and 
disperses the income poorly, the risk for civil war increases.
32
 
When I conduct my process-trace I will look for signs in the empirical 
evidence regarding corruption, poor public service provision and economic 
mismanagement. Since Iraq has large quantities of oil resources, this should be the 
first place to look for evidence. However, I believe that it’s important to look for 
other recourses of income, such as drugs and weapon smuggling in order not to 
hinder my analysis and have an open mind to the empirical evidence. Weapon 
smuggling for example could generate a substantial aid for rebel groups, both in 
funds and actual arms for their fighters. 
 
Donations from diasporas 
 
Donations from diasporas have not been the sole factor to explain the start of a 
civil war but they have an ability to prolong and renew a civil war. This is a 
crucial factor to take into account since donations help rebels to pay for their costs 
in or before the civil war.
33
 When I begin my process-tracing I will investigate if 
there are any substantial donations from diasporas and if they can be traced to 
bigger organizations or countries. 
 
Subvention from hostile governments 
 
Subventions from hostile governments are a strong factor considering finance 
for rebels. Arms, education and funds that flow into favored groups in the country 
or region in question help such groups. This phenomenon was common during the 
Cold war when the two super powers aided several rebel groups in a great number 
of conflicts.
34
 
I will investigate in this factor in the same manner as “donations from 
diasporas”. Since the Iraq War happened after the initiation of the War on terror 
and in an era of the globalization, this indicator might look different in the Iraq 
War scenery. Due to fear of exposure from the agents of the War on terror, 
subventions from hostile governments could be veiled in more secrecy, thus 
become harder to find. If this hypothesis from my part proves to be true, demands 
on criticism of the sources become very important. 
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The second factor in the variable opportunity is atypical low cost. Low costs 
could affect countries or regions in negative manner regarding the initiation of a 
civil war. Indicators for atypical low cost are: mean income per capita, male 
secondary school enrollment, growth rate of the economy, cheap conflict-specific 
material and a weak government military capability.
35
 
 
Mean income per capita 
 
This indicator relates to the ability for rebel groups to give enough payment to 
their enlisted fighters. Collier and Hoeffler mention that desertion could be a 
potential problem if their pay is lower than “normal” jobs or if they can’t provide 
their families or themselves. 
This indicator is problematic since many characteristics correlate with it. The 
mean income per capita index could be interpreted differently or not at all if you 
don’t know how much the specific rebel group is paying their enlisted fighters.36 I 
will search for empirical evidence regarding desertion in order to be able to use 
this indicator. If there are a high number of deserters, the mean income per capita 
to the enlisted fighters ought to be low or vice versa. The reason that I choose to 
search for desertions is that I believe that a search for exact sums in payment to 
rebels could be hard to find. 
 
Male secondary school enrollment 
 
The greed and grievances theory state that young uneducated males are most 
prominent as recruits to rebel groups. If there is a large population consisting of 
young and uneducated males, the recruitment pool becomes larger and the costs 
lower as the supply becomes greater in relation to the demand.
37
 To find this 
indicator I will search the empirical evidence for unemployment in Iraq during my 
stated years. 
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Growth rate of the economy 
 
The growth rate of a country’s economy correlates with the risk for civil war. 
The lower the rate, the higher the risk for unconstitutional political change and 
thereby civil war. A low growth rate could also correlate with objective 
grievances but this will be outlined under the next chapter.
38
 To succeed to 
investigate this indicator I will follow Iraq’s GDP look for decreases. Even if 
Collier and Hoeffler didn’t find any specific decrease or increase, I feel that I 
must be consistent with the theory and look for the GDP and see if it decreases or 
increases. 
 
Conflict-specific capital and weak government military capability 
 
If military equipment, such as weapons and explosives are cheap, the initiation 
of a civil war becomes cheaper and thereby the risk increases. The risk is greater 
if the government has a bad military capability and is not educated or equipped to 
sustain threats from rebels. Collier and Hoeffler take the geography into account 
since it correlates with the military capability. If the populations are dispersed in a 
wide area it becomes harder for the government forces to control them and 
maintain order which increases the risk for civil war.
39
 To identify this indicator I 
will search the empirical evidence for how the access to military equipment was 
and how the government and the Coalition (since they were in charge of the 
security apparatus plus the government military forces) managed to meet the 
threat from the insurgency. 
3.1.2 Objective grievances 
There are four factors to consider in objective grievances: ethnic or religious 
hatred, political repression, political exclusion and economic inequality, all 
recognized to motivate and contribute to conflicts and civil war.
40
 As I mentioned, 
these factors are hard to measure in numbers. If there are religious hatreds among 
a population, they are there for various reasons but you can’t really measure how 
big the hatreds are in a number alone. What you can measure is how these hatreds 
affect the given situation and look for correlations in regards of the factors 
studied. For example; are there any violent acts based on ethnic or religious 
hatreds or could political exclusion contribute to uprisings, the rebellion’s size and 
disorder. 
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Ethnic or religious hatred 
 
Ethnic or religious hatreds are according to Collier and Hoeffler widely 
perceived as a cause for grievances and civil war. They occur in societies that are 
multi-ethnic or multi-religious and are a result of polarization. If an ethnic group 
is dominant in percentage, above 45 % in a country, the risk for civil war 
increases.
41
 I will look for evidence regarding ethnic or religious hatreds and if it 
exists see how they contribute to the conflict. 
 
Political repression 
 
Political repression often differs between peace and conflict episodes, with a 
higher level during conflicts. Repression increases the chance for civil war 
although if there is a severe repression, it tends to decrease conflicts but exactly 
how much is left untold by Collier and Hoeffler.
42
 I will search the empirical 
evidence for signs of political repression and if it exists, what the result of it is. 
 
Political exclusion 
 
Political exclusion could also give rise to grievances especially if there is a 
clear ethnic majority who constitutes as a minority in the society as the extraction 
possibilities are higher in terms of funds. Collier and Hoeffler name this particular 
situation ethnic dominance. The situation in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s reign 
is a good example of an ethnic dominance as the Shia Muslims constituted as a 
minority despite the fact that they were a clear majority in percentage of the total 
population (60 %).
43
 When I search for this factor I will see if there was any 
political exclusion and what this contributed to the conflict. 
 
Economic inequality 
 
Economic inequality is the last factor for the variable objective grievances. The 
authors note that the relationship between inequality and rebellion is closely tied 
together. If parts Rebellions to incite redistribution of income, violent acts to stop 
distribution against minorities from governments or rich regions that back 
rebellions to preempt redistribution are examples of how grievances could erupt 
from economic inequality.
44
 To identify this factor I will search the empirical 
evidence for a clear and visible economic inequality in areas such as parts of cities 
and between ethnicities. Attacks against profitable industries and hostile takeovers 
are also patterns that I will search for since this could lead to economic inequality. 
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3.2 Critique 
Keen, professor at London School of Economics and Political Science, 
criticizes Collier on several points in his article Greed and grievance in civil war. 
The main critique is directed against Colliers work based on the greed and 
grievances theory, including The Bottom Billion, and his approach to grievances 
as a motive for rebellion and civil war.
45
 As Collier uses his theory of greed and 
grievances this critique could be viewed against Colliers and Hoefflers theory. 
Even if Collier and Hoeffler concludes that the variable opportunity have a more 
explanatory power quantitatively, a danger persists if you ignore the variable 
objective grievances in future studies and work. Keen notes that grievances played 
a key role in the re-ignition of the civil war in Sierra Leone, when bitter soldiers 
staged a coup d’état after the rapid downsizing of the Sierra Leonean military.46 
Keen means that Colliers and Hoefflers approach to objective grievances tend to 
erupt in sweeping conclusion about grievances which could lead to 
misunderstandings. Such potential misunderstandings could lead to severe 
miscalculations in peace agreements according to Keen.
47
 Keen also refers to 
Stewart, who finds that greed often interacts with grievances in complex ways and 
that they both stem from each other. Stewart emphasizes that it is crucial to 
understand how these variables interact, since both variables are needed.
48
 I will 
take this critique into consideration in my analysis. 
3.2.1 Motivation to the usage of the theory 
The reason I chose this theory is that the two independent variables cover a 
wide range of factors and indicators which I think will be enough to explain the 
eruption of the civil sectarian war. Even if the theory isn’t intended to explain an 
escalation in specific, an escalation with low and high intensity of the two 
independent variables ought to take place within a region or a country who are 
heading to civil war. As I will use this theory in a qualitative manner, it could be 
viewed that my ambition is to try this theory on my chosen case; however my case 
is in the center of this essay and thereby will this essay rather be a theory 
consuming case study.
49
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4 Methodological Approach 
4.1 Process-Tracing 
In order to answer my stated questions I have used the method of process-
tracing. Hall recognizes that process-tracing is especially good for testing or using 
theories marked by multiple interaction effects and where the outcome is hard to 
explain with a few variables. Greed and grievances theory may only contain two 
independent variables but the factors and indicators contributing to these variables 
are more.
50
 The many factors and indicators for the two independent variables 
ought to help me to reach a higher internal validity as they cover both social and 
economic areas. This also ought to make it easier to not conduct any measurement 
errors. The method is also of good use when the specific outcome is known but 
not how and why it happened. Process-tracing is also a good tool to find so-called 
path dependencies, formative events of great importance that often sets the path 
for the future process.
51
 
Process-tracing is well-suited when it comes to finding causal connections and 
it’s an effective tool if the theory used can give you a hypothesis, preconditions 
for the process studied or the causal mechanism.
52
 Process-tracing allow you to do 
multiple observations within the empirical evidence and identify your independent 
variables; follow their causal chain and mechanism within the stated investigation 
and the chosen dependent variable’s outcome.53 
Process-tracing can take several forms depending on what you study. If it’s a 
linear casual chain that is studied you identify certain events that lead to a 
phenomenon in a simplistic scheme. If you study a more complex phenomenon 
with interacting variables you need to do empirical observations and identify the 
interconnections, the causal mechanism and their effects. You begin your process-
tracing with a chosen starting point, which in my case is the Iraq war 2003 after 
the proclaimed victory. The end of the process-tracing is your dependent variables 
outcome, a specific event or a chosen year which in my case is the event of the 
Samara bombing in 2006 – the start of the civil sectarian war.54 
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Since I only look at one case this study is a single case study. The study would 
have a higher external validity if I compared two cases but a single case study can 
reach a high internal validity and if you stay open for various explanations in 
regards of your purpose and question which increase the chance for a high internal 
validity.
55
 
4.2 Operationalization 
When I use greed and grievances theory I will use the two variables 
opportunity and objective grievances as my two independent variables. With my 
two independent variables I have the appurtenant factors and indicators that I 
mentioned in chapter three to search for when I do my empirical observations, 
identify the interconnection and causal mechanisms with deductive research 
identification. I will follow my independent variables’ process through my stated 
years which hopefully will help to explain how and why the Iraq War escalated 
and the civil sectarian war erupted. I will measure the intensity in my two 
independent variables in terms of active insurgents and daily insurgent attacks. 
The reason that I choose to measure the intensity in my independent variables 
in this way is that an escalation in insurgencies ought to precede the actual 
outbreak of the civil sectarian war. As the independent variables are causes to 
civil war, their indicators ought to be present and give rise to insurgencies which 
in their turn could give rise to civil war. To be sure that they actually do, I feel the 
need to measure this since I’ve an ambition to explain how the Iraq wars 
escalation led to a civil sectarian war. I need proof of an increased intensity and a 
clear link that the indicators for my independent variables actually lead to the civil 
sectarian war. 
My dependent variable will be the start of the civil sectarian war. The reason I 
choose this dependent variable is due to the fact that Collier and Hoeffler uses it 
in their theory. The usage of a different dependent variable would be inconsistent. 
It would also hinder my purpose and the use of my method since you know your 
outcome or what you want to explain when using process-tracing. Even if I know 
the start of the civil war beforehand, a measure of my dependent variable needs to 
be clarified since I don’t know the empirical evidence and the process before the 
outbreak of the civil sectarian war. Collier and Hoeffler use the standard 
definition of civil war, at least 1000 combat related deaths per year of which 5 % 
are from government forces and an identifiable rebel group.
56
 I however, cannot 
use the standard definition in my study since I want to explain a civil sectarian 
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war inside a war. The death numbers in the Iraq war ought to exceed the standard 
set rather quickly. I will instead use the first criteria of a civil wars existence; 
when organized groups uses violent means that aim to take power at the center or 
in a region, or to change government policies. 
My pre-understanding of the Iraq war could hamper my empirical analysis. If I 
only look for evidence in regards of my factors in my process-trace there is a risk 
that I miss other important factors that was a result from interaction between the 
variables opportunity and objective grievances. Thus, I need to be open for other 
factors in order to keep my process-trace free from systematic measurement 
errors.
57
 If I can’t find any additional factors, Collier and Hoeffler will have 
proven to be right in their choice of factors.
58
 This will also increase the chance 
for high internal validity of my result.
59
 I don’t aim for any external validity with 
this study; however, if the same study is conducted on similar cases, a higher 
external validity could be achieved. 
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5 The Path to Civil Sectarian War 
5.1 The Foundation 2003 
After the invasion and proclaimed victory, the US and its allies (the Coalition) 
stood before an enormous task.  Iraq was in ruins and the Iraqi army with 
approximately 100 000 members were defeated and Iraq’s people awaited the 
proclaimed liberation. The Coalition consisted of 150 000 troops despite pre-
estimates that the invasion and after match would require up to 500 000. The 
situation were however still manageable and many Iraqis still held some 
expectations that the Coalition were to succeed with their liberation from 
Hussein’s reign and restore order. However, according to Mumford, political 
discussions about post-war reconstruction only took place days before the 
invasion and there was a chronic lack of inter-agency co-operation. The US 
government also showed reluctance to use the military for peacekeeping efforts 
and reconstruction.
60
 
Large parts of the Iraqi people welcomed the chance for change but the lack of 
a reconstruction plan together with insufficient number of troops created 
opportunity and space for severe looting and public disorder.
61
 This affected an 
already fragile socio-economic situation which became worse than before the 
invasion. Unemployment, electric and water distribution problems due to poor 
public service and economic mismanagement due to lack of a solid reconstruction 
plan, worsened the situation further.
62
 This takes two of the factors that I 
mentioned before into account. Even if the looting that took place was not of a 
specific natural resource it could be interpreted as extortion of resources and a 
weak military capability as the US troops, due to their limited number, didn’t 
succeed to stop the looting which gave greed a chance. This point directly to the 
factors opportunity for financing rebellion and atypical low costs. 
The reconstruction work of the Iraqi society that took place was directed under 
the American Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) with Paul Bremer as the 
director.
63
 In May 2003 The CPA decided to disband the Iraqi army and the 
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political Ba’ath party.64 Not only was this a great insult to the Sunni members of 
the Ba’ath party, they also possessed the skills in local politics since they had 
governed Iraq the last thirty years. Now they stood on the outside, unemployed 
with military and political skills, with vast assets to arms and ammunition in a 
ruined society.
65
 Conflict specific capital and indicators for mean per income was 
now a reality in the after match of the American invasion. 
The bulk of the Ba’ath party and the Iraqi army consisted of Sunni Muslims 
which had a powerful position during the era of Hussein despite the fact that the 
Sunnis are a clear minority in Iraq, approximately 20 % of the total population. 
The population in Iraq has historically been divided into different tribes and 
ethnic groups. There are over 350 tribes in the Iraq which forms an important 
political structure. Tribe, nationality and religious identity plays an important role. 
There is also competition over influence and economics between the different 
tribes and during Hussein’s reign the Sunni population was in absolute favor 
despite their minority to the larger Shia population.
66
 
In July 2003 the CPA hand elected the new Iraqi Interim Council (IGC) who 
was to work with the CPA, consisting mostly of Shia Muslims. Many members of 
the IGC were former exiles with no political connections and unfamiliar faces to 
the local Iraqi population which fueled resentment among the Sunni population.
67
 
The Coalition forces became occupiers instead of liberators in the eyes of large 
parts of the Sunni population and the former members of the Ba’ath party and 
Iraqi army, giving rise to the objective grievances variable as political exclusion 
became a reality for the Sunni population.
68
 
Both independent variables were now active in post-conflict Iraq. The 
insurgency started in the summer of 2003 as a result of the decision to disband the 
Iraqi army and Ba’ath party together with the inauguration of the IGC. Many of 
the insurgents and the different insurgent groups derived from the newly 
disbanded army were of Sunni ethnicity, Ba’ath party members and Sunni tribes 
who saw their economic position fade away when the Sunni Patronage 
disappeared. Tribal and national honor did also matter as the Sunni patronage 
found themselves victims of US arrest raids and questioning, especially arrest of 
tribal sheiks who held a distinguish position in the Iraq tribal system which 
resulted in ethnic hatreds against American forces. It’s also evident that conflict 
specific capital and a weak government military capability played a key role in 
the start of the insurgency, as the bulk of it consisted of ex-army officers and 
young unemployed males, ex-soldiers and Ba’ath party members.69 
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Opportunity for financing rebellion and atypical low costs thus created a 
situation where the initiation for an insurgency became easier and when political 
exclusion and ethnic hatreds started, the Sunni insurgency took root. Hence, the 
start of the insurgency and the start of the escalation of the Iraq War were a result 
of an interaction between the two independent variables opportunity and objective 
grievances.
70
 
The insurgency in Iraq was not expansive at first, however, Hashim notes that 
the security situation continued to deteriorate during the following months. In the 
fall of 2003 there was an estimated calculation of at least 5000 active Sunni 
insurgents and an average of 20 insurgency attacks a day.
71
 
The two independent variables continued to interact during the fall which 
explains the worsened situation in the fall of 2003. Insurgents began to attack high 
value targets, such as socio-economic elements and foreign NGOs. Many of the 
NGOs left Iraq since the attacks made it too dangerous for them to stay and made 
the reconstruction more difficult.
72
 This affected the chance for a stabile 
reconstruction phase while the CPA continued to show non-improvement in their 
governing ability. This created a lost momentum in the conflict and gave 
insurgents a chance to foster.
73
 The unemployment was still high, peaking at 29,9 
% together with a loss in -33,1 % in the GDP which indicates that atypical low 
costs still were a reality.
74
 
During the same period the attacks from the growing insurgency was met by 
aggressive warfare. Search and kill/capture operations and cordons became a 
standard operating procedure for the Coalition.
75
 Civilian deaths in checkpoints, 
miss-guided air strikes further fueled ethnic hatreds among the Iraqi population 
which worked as a motivator to the insurgency.
76
 US officials still held a positive 
view of the situation and kept their hopes to the ICG. US forces also managed to 
kill Hussein’s two sons which US officials thought would hinder the insurgents 
will to fight. Their deaths instead proved to be a catalyst for more ethnic hatreds 
against Coalition forces and in turn made more Iraqis to insurgents.
77
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5.2 A Slippery Road Down Hill 2003-2004 
Most insurgency groups were of Sunni ethnicity and had two overarching 
goals: to expel the US forces from Iraq and end the occupation and take back their 
former political and economic position.
78
 This goal point to the fact that a civil 
sectarian war between Sunni and Shia Muslims was not yet at hand. On top of the 
insurgency, high activities of criminal gangs began to erupt as a result of the 
chance to extort natural resources. Looting and oil smuggling by criminal gangs 
began in the fall of 2003 and contributed with substantial funds to the insurgents. 
The criminal gangs also took part in drug trade, arms sales and kidnappings. The 
gangs supported various insurgency groups with foot soldiers, arms and funds. 
Many gangs also had relationships with tribes around the Iraqi border which made 
it easier to smuggle goods to the neighboring countries.
79
 Wide spread corruption 
within the newly established police force left the criminal activity to be able to 
ravage the country mainly uninterrupted.
80
 This evidently point to the factor 
extortion of natural resources both in regards of corruption and the illegal trade. 
As insurgencies need to have funds of various sort to be able to conduct their 
activities, this became an important factor for the insurgencies continued growth. 
US intelligence estimates tells that the payment to conduct an attack against 
Coalition forces were USD 100 and USD 500 if the attack was successful at the 
start of the insurgency. In the fall of 2003 this sum had increased to USD 1000-
2000 per attack and USD 5000 if the attack was successful.
81
 This point to the fact 
that more resources where extracted hence, opportunity for financing rebellions 
now included smuggling and corruption. 
The smuggling across the border countries to Iraq raises the question if 
subventions from hostile governments were presence. Hashim notes that the US 
warned both Syria and Iran not to help the insurgents in Iraq but believes that it’s 
safe to assume that covert support to the insurgency was at hand. As dubious this 
empirical evidence could look, Pirnie recognizes that the Iraqi border police was 
ill-equipped and under staffed, leaving large parts of the Iraqi border unguarded. 
This rather points to weak government military capability. Nonetheless, the 
smuggling contributed with funds to the insurgents, the factor atypical low costs 
thus made it easier to extort resources.
82
 
Iraqis who worked for the Coalition and within economic infrastructure such as 
oilfields, the new Iraqi army, police force and Iraqi Officials within IGC became 
targets to the insurgents during the late 2003 and continuously in 2004. This 
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further hampered the reconstruction and a viable chance for recovery for the Iraqi 
society and raised increasing difficulties in the socio-economic sphere. This 
created more chances to attract recruits for the insurgents as unemployment still 
was large.
83
 This led to economic inequality as violent attacks, aiming to hinder 
distribution of recourses from oil fields, were evident with the attacks on 
economic infrastructure. An interaction between the two interdependent variables 
thus becomes visible again and yet again the first activity was in the independent 
variable opportunity which then led to objective grievances. 
Despite the persistent failed reconstruction of Iraq, Coalition forces continued 
their aggressive warfare in 2004. In turn many attacks against Coalition forces 
conducted by the insurgents included IED attacks and quick ambushes. This often 
resulted in civilian deaths when the Coalition forces engaged back since the more 
agile and less heavily equipped insurgents could move faster and simply 
disappeared, but the civilian population often didn’t have time to flee.84 Civilian 
deaths often gave rise to ethnic hatreds since the civilian casualties’ dependents 
had a culture of honour and revenge, thus civilian deaths gave rise to new 
insurgent. 
In 2004 many of the Coalition forces stayed inside their bases outside towns or 
villages. This alienated them since they didn’t show themselves on a regular basis. 
More armor and heavier guns due to refined development in insurgency methods, 
especially the IEDs, created alienation to the population.
85
 An example of an 
alienating conduct is the Coalitions counter measures against vehicle borne 
IEDs.
86
 The Coalition kept a distance against Iraq traffic and fired at vehicles that 
came to close even if they didn’t constituted as a threat.87 This behavior fits in into 
political repression. 
To fire at civilian vehicles, regardless of threat and who is behind the steering 
wheel and in the passenger seat, is in my opinion a repressive conduct. Even if 
Coalition forces didn’t enjoy any political power, they were closely associated 
with the IGC and CPA. This in turn increased ethnic hatreds against the 
Coalition.
88
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5.2.1 Foreign Insurgents 
Parts of the insurgents in Iraq were foreign Jihadists and derived from various 
Islamic countries. Many were non-experienced fighters who sought Jihad, others 
were experienced terrorists and many received military training from the political 
excluded ex-army officers and Ba’ath party members. Despite the fact that the 
majority of insurgents were Iraqi nationals, the foreign insurgents played a big 
role in leadership, propaganda and radicalization regarding methods used in 
attacks.
89
 
Many of the foreign insurgents came to Iraq with the intention to fight their 
Jihad due to ethnic hatreds against the US presence which they saw as a political 
repression against Muslims. Clear evidence on foreign insurgents is Al Qaeda 
presence in Iraq 2004. There is no reliable evidence that Al Qaeda existed in Iraq 
before the invasion, however, in 2004 it was clear that they did.
90
 The group 
Jamaat al-Tawhid wa’al Jihad was a foreign insurgent group led militant Sunni 
extremist Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. Originally from Jordan, Zarqawi had been in 
radical Islamic companies since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. It’s 
unclear when Zarqawi entered Iraq but he took responsibility of various attacks 
from 2004 and thereafter.
91
 
Zarqawi incited killings on the Shia population in Iraq and pledged allegiance 
to Osama Bin Ladin and Al Qaeda on 17 October 2004.
92
 Severe atrocities – 
beheadings, suicide attacks, attacks against public places, such as markets and 
Shia religious monuments were exercised to start a sectarian conflict between the 
Sunni and Shia population, which he hoped would render the Coalitions attempt 
to rebuild Iraq and ultimately create a war against Sunni and Shia Muslims around 
the world. Zarqawi justified his action on grounds which mainly could be traced 
to the factor religious hatreds. He viewed the Shia Muslims as non-Muslims as 
they had strayed away from the true Sunni Muslim beliefs but also on the fact that 
most of the security forces and political power in Iraq were held by Shia Muslims 
due to the political exclusion in 2003. 
As the CPA was dissolved on 28 June 2004 and the political power was handed 
over to the interim government, which was to hold democratic elections in 
January 2005, Zarqawi planned to disrupt this election.
93
 AQIs actions and plans 
played a big part in the increasing violence during the year of 2004 and the 
actions conducted by him and his allied affected an already volatile situation. 
Due to the weak government military capability, Coalition- and local security 
forces couldn’t provide enough security for the Shia Muslims who became 
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exposed to the new sectarian violence. Parts of the Shia population took matters in 
their own hands and the Madhi army emerged as an alternative community service 
for parts of the Shia population. The Madhi army had existed during the era of 
Hussein and worked as an anti-pole against the Ba’ath party in the Shia slums. 
The Madhi Army was led by Moqtada al-Sadr and was believed to have 10 000 
insurgents under his command.
94
 
Not only did the Madhi Army contribute to the insurgency, they also began to 
infiltrate the political sphere and local security forces in order to get control over 
oil revenues.
95
 Infiltration by Shia insurgents to the security forces and political 
sphere contributed with insights in Coalition tactics and protection, which led to 
refined developments of the attacks.
96
 Even if this isn’t strictly extortion of 
natural recourses, it indicates corruption as the extract of viable information 
could be used for their own benefits in combat which according to me is a 
substantial resource. 
The growing corruption is evident with the fact that it was mainly, with a few 
exceptions, Sunni insurgents that were attacked by Coalition forces which 
entrenched the motivator political exclusion in the eyes of Sunni Muslims. 
Due to the weak military government capability, Sunni tribes were also 
affected by AQI’s violence. They were forced to pledge obedience to AQI since 
they, due to the absent Coalition forces, controlled the power through intimidation 
and grim violent attacks on those who refused to cooperate with them. While 
many of the local Sunni insurgents had relied on foreign insurgents to conduct 
more extreme attacks, such as suicide attacks, AQI turned the relationship over 
and used the Sunni insurgents as cover and support. A good example of support is 
that AQI took over parts of the extortion of recourses as a result when the Sunni 
smuggling operations was in AQIs hands.
97
 This helps to explain AQIs ability to 
be able to remain operative within the Iraq War. 
However, AQIs ability to sustain their attacks against both Coalition forces as 
well as the Shia population is not entirely based on the extortion of resources or 
AQIs willingness to conduct violent attacks and intimidate the local Sunni 
insurgents in order to gain power. Throughout the year of 2004 large cities in Iraq 
saw severe fighting between insurgents and Coalition forces as well as killings of 
government officials, NGOs and people who worked for the Coalition which 
further hampered the reconstruction and a chance for socio-economic 
improvement.
98
 In November 2004 the city Fallujah was assaulted by the 
Coalition and the new Iraqi army. Thousands of Iraqi civilian and insurgents died 
which fueled further ethnic hatreds against the Coalitions. The soldiers in the 
Iraqi army who were used in this battle were Shia Muslims, which was viewed 
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with great anger and further fixed the political repression in the eyes of Sunni 
Muslims in the city. AQI took advantage of this and could recruited more 
insurgents to their organization.
99
 
The rise of AQI was thus a result of an interaction between the two 
independent variables, where religious hatreds and opportunity for financing 
rebellion were the main factors. The sectarian violence thus started in 2004 but 
the civilian sectarian war had not yet started as partly due to the fact that the 
Madhi army didn’t possess the funds necessary but also that the sectarian violence 
was new as it began in October. 
A reliable number of active insurgents in 2004 are hard to find in the empirical 
evidence, approximately 20 000 active Sunni insurgents plus the 10 000 Shia 
insurgents. The growing attacks (20 insurgency attacks a day in 2003 to an 
average of 50 a day in 2004) are a more reliable indicator that my independent 
variables give rise to a more intense conflict.
100
 
5.3 Inner Strife in 2005-2006 
The election of a new government took place in 2005 with the help of a 
massive security congregation. Shia and Kurd population constituted a majority of 
the voters. Large parts of the Sunni population didn’t vote due to threats from 
their own community, especially AQI and the Sunni insurgents, as well as a fear 
of further marginalization due to the uneven religious entity in Iraq. This led to a 
Shia Muslim majority in the new parliament the political exclusion got further 
entrenched. Despite the election and the inherent security operation, AQI alone 
claimed over 100 violent attacks in January, including suicide-attacks, attacks on 
religious Shia monuments and assaults on Shia dominated cities.
101
 
The Sunni sectarian attacks against Shia Muslims were retaliated by the Shia 
insurgents who used death squads to kill Sunnis; academics, middle class people 
and merchants were the main targets as they often possessed funds. Hostile take 
overs against Sunni owned petrol stations and illegal taxation also took place. 
Thus, they began to extort recourses from the Sunni population which led to 
redistribution of resources that resulted in economic inequality. This evidently 
point to the fact that the two independent variables interacted in 2005. 
Evidence that they had enough funds to maintain their activity were in the city 
of Basra where the Mahdi army began attacks against the Coalition forces in the 
city. The fighting in Basra could be traced to extortion of resources and thereby 
the variable opportunity as Basra had profitable oil revenues and smuggling 
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routes. Unable to handle the security due to the weak government military 
capability, the Coalition forces had to take cover in their bases to protect 
themselves while the sectarian violence became more severe as Sunni population 
was heavily targeted by the Shia insurgents.
102
 Yet again the two independent 
variables interact when the factors opportunity for financing rebellion, atypical 
low costs and religious hatreds created a volatile situation. 
Shia insurgents also continued their efforts to infiltrate the police force and the 
new government institutions and leaked plans from the armed forces in regards of 
upcoming security operations. This point to corruption which indicates extortion 
of resources.
103
 As the Shia insurgents extorted more resources and infiltrated 
government institutions they became stronger and could match the Sunni 
insurgency.
104
 Despite the growing Shia insurgency’s capability most of the 
violent attacks were still conducted by the Sunni insurgents and were directed 
against the Shia population, Coalition forces and Iraqis who worked for the 
government or the Coalition.
105
 
As a result of religious hatreds the sectarian violence began to intensify during 
2005 due to the Shia insurgents newly won capability to induce counter-attacks 
against Sunni insurgents. On the 16
th
 of July 2005 a suicide bomber managed to 
kill 100 people and damage a Shiite mosque. This gave the Shia insurgents more 
support from the Shia community as they called for more security against the 
Sunni insurgents as ethnic hatreds continued to fuel the Iraqi society.
106
 Overall 
there were an average of 70 insurgency attacks a day in 2005, an increase with 20 
attacks a day which could be explained by a result from the growing Shia 
insurgency as more religious hatreds and more extortion of resources were 
extracted from Shia insurgents, an interaction between the two independent 
variables are thus visible again. 
In early 2006 the sectarian violence escalated in areas that were mixed with 
Sunni and Shia religious entities while the Coalition estimated that there were 
between 20,000-50,000 active Sunni insurgents. However, Shia insurgents were in 
early 2006 estimated as a greater threat than the Sunni insurgents, mainly due to 
their infiltration to the government and Iraq police force.
107
 Thus the Shia 
insurgents were definitely organized in the late 2005 and early 2006 and fought a 
violent struggle against Sunni insurgents and the Coalition over oil revenues and 
due to ethnic hatreds. To match the newly won Shia capability, Sunni insurgents 
relocated to what Pirnie calls sectarian lines (Sunni areas and neighborhoods) 
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which made it easier for them to protect themselves from the sectarian violence 
and to retaliate.
108
 
Thus my dependent variable is present: Organized groups uses violent means 
that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government 
policies, which in this case were: Sunni and Shia insurgents who use violent 
means against each other in order to take power in Iraq.
109
 
On 22 February AQI bombed the Golden dome mosque in Samara, one of the 
most important Shia shrines in the world. This erupted in retaliation from Shia 
insurgents and the sectarian violence grew. The Madhi army who had 10 000 
members in 2004, had 60 000 active members in mid-2006 due to the support they 
gained from the motivator religious hatreds as the Mosque was destroyed.
110
 
Zarqawi’s plan, to incite a sectarian conflict due to his religious hatreds against 
Shia Muslims succeeded as the insurgency conflict morphed into a sectarian civil 
war between Sunni and Shia insurgents. However, the attacks from both 
insurgencies against the Coalition continued. The civil war thus became a parallel 
civil sectarian war inside the Iraq War.
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6 Conclusion 
6.1.1 Result 
How did the Iraq war’s escalation during the years 2003-2006 lead to a civil 
sectarian war and how could the Greed and grievances theory help to explain 
this? 
 
The beginning of the Iraq War’s escalation could be traced back to the inability 
of the Coalition and the CPA to undertake the reconstruction of Iraq’s society. 
This gave rise to the independent variable opportunity as unemployment, 
economic mismanagement and poor public service became a reality for the Iraqi 
society. As this happened, extortion of recourses was undertaken throughout Iraq 
as looting started due to the weak government military capability of the Coalition. 
The independent variable objective grievances was first seen when the decision to 
disband the Iraqi army and Ba’ath party gave rise to political exclusion as most of 
the Iraqi army and Ba’ath party members were of Sunni religious entity. As a 
result of an interaction between opportunity and objective grievances the 
insurgency began in a low scale and the escalation of the Iraq War began. 
Thus an interaction between the two independent variables gave rise to the 
insurgency. Collier and Hoeffler’s conclusion regarding the explanatory value of 
the variable opportunity is strong, more indicators are evidently at hand than 
objective grievances but there were still an interaction and the political exclusion 
gave in the fall of 2003 rise to ethnic hatreds against the Coalition who became 
occupiers in many Iraqis eyes. Thus both the independent variables helped to 
explain the start of the insurgency. The decision to disband the Iraqi army and 
Ba’ath are also according to me a formative moment as it set the path for the 
future process. 
The start of sectarian violence could be traced to Objective grievances as this 
attracted Zarqawi to Iraq. His religious hatreds against Shia Muslims resulted in 
killings and destruction on the Shia population and Shia religious monuments. As 
he pledged loyalty to Al Qaeda, AQI became operative and through intimidation 
and violent force they could extort resources through oil smuggling and other 
revenues, and AQI succeeded to grow. 
The weak government military capability made the situation worse, giving rise 
to more ethnic and religious hatreds as the violence ravaged the country. The AQI 
entering is thus explained with the objective grievances and more closely with 
ethnic hatreds but in order to sustain their activities, funds were needed, hence 
they extracted resources. The two independent variables are here interconnected 
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again although in the opposite manner if compared with the start of the 
insurgency. 
Due to the weak government military capability parts of the Shia population 
gave support to the Madhi army and Shia insurgents became operative as a mean 
to protect them against the religious hatred from AQI. However, Shia insurgents 
first became a substantial threat to the Sunni population in 2005 as they began to 
extort resources with hostile take overs. AQI entering in Iraq is according to me 
the second formative moment as this was the beginning of the sectarian violence 
which continued throughout 2004 to the end of this study. 
The spike in violence and intensification in attacks in 2005 and early 2006 are 
explained with the increasing extortion of resources as both Sunni and Shia 
insurgents were organized, the persistent weak government military capability, 
fear of further political exclusion from the Sunni population and religious hatreds 
between Shia and Sunni Muslims. The indicator of my dependent variable, start of 
civil war, was actually first seen in the empirical evidence just before the Samara 
bombing took place. But since the sectarian violence culminated when AQI blew 
the Golden dome mosque in Samara, the bombing is commonly considered to be 
the starting point of the parallel civil sectarian war. 
6.1.2 Use of Theory and Method 
The theory and method have been of good use to explain the escalation in the 
Iraq War and the start of the civil sectarian war. The method allowed me to 
identify my independent variables and then follow them through my chosen years. 
The benefit to know my end date made it easy to know when to stop and what to 
look for. I did find that the two independent variables managed to cover the 
causes that led to the escalation and the start of the civil sectarian war. It became 
obvious that the two independent variables were needed in order to follow my 
purpose. They complement each other well and could be viewed in terms of how 
(opportunity) and why (objective grievances). 
My choice to start the process-trace after the momentary victory in the Iraq war 
resulted in an explanation of why the insurgency started in the first place and the 
theory’s independent variables were well suited to explain this.  
This could also be viewed as a sidetrack that didn’t fit my stated purpose since 
the insurgency didn’t have a violent sectarian character. However, it’s my opinion 
that an understanding of the foundation of the Iraqi insurgency and escalation is 
necessary to understand the start of the civil sectarian war. I also believe that this 
proves that I’ve been true to my theory, method and my chosen years which have 
resulted in a high internal validity since the theory and method managed to 
explain the escalation and the start of the civil sectarian war. 
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